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INFANT CRIES AS EVOLUTIONARY MELODRAMA:
EXTORTION OR DECEPTION?*
N. S. Thompson, Brian Dessureau & Carolyn Olson




Crying is melodramatic in the sense that crying babies seem to respond to a great
variety of distressing situations with behaviors, such as gasping, choking, and
panting that would be appropriate to a very specific respiratory emergency. In
this paper we develop models to explore whether extortion or deception is the
more plausible origin of the melodrama in a baby's cry. According to these
models, deception seems a more plausible origin than extortion because extortion
requires the incoherent assumption that nature can select against the genetic
interests of an organism. By comparison, the assumptions required to rationalize
a deception explanation - that the parent share in the benefits given to its
offspring - seem relatively harmless and consistent with contemporary
sociobiological theory.
The crying of a baby is a thoroughly melodramatic performance. Crying is
melodramatic in the sense that crying babies seem to respond to a great variety
of distressing situations with behaviors, such as gasping, choking, and panting
that would be appropriate to a very specific respiratory emergency. Subjected to
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indebted to Professor Kennison for spotting an additonal implication of the inequality,
rb-yr[-H] >c
a sudden shock, such as an immunization injection, a baby draws an unusually
deep and rasping breath which it often follows with a with a series of yelps that
seem utterly to exhaust its supply of air (Wolff 1969).
Such cries have at least a superficial resemblance to the evolved communi-
cative displays of animals. Like the singing of birds (Catchpole & Slater 1995;
Beecher et al. 1998), they are highly stylized and contain species-specific,
motivation-specific, and individual specific information. Moreover, like animal
displays, human infant cries seem to provoke specific and involuntary responses
in fellow species members. Research demonstrates that adults find these cries
extraordinarily upsetting, distracting, and/or irritating, even by comparison
with other unpleasant noises, such as "phased machine noise" (Morsbach,
Mcculloch & Clark 1986). These adult responses seem not to be the product of
training: even college-age males, who typically have little experience with young
babies, give physiological responses to a baby's cries that are similar in pattern
(if somewhat less intense) to the responses of more knowledgeable young
women or adults of both sexes (Green, Jones & Gustafson 1987; Boukydis &
Burgess 1982).
Given these parallels with the evolved displays of animals, there is remark-
ably little speculation on the evolution of infant crying. Ann Murray (1985)
summarizes the three major approaches to the explanation of adults' responses
to crying. The first approach isknown as the innate releaser model, and its ideas
are derived from the work of John Bowlby on mother-infant attachment
(Bowlby 196911982). This approach posits that the cry acts as an innate releaser
of all forms of parenting behavior. This process is viewed as automatic and
biologically determined. The cry is matched with specialized detection capabili-
ties and behavioral patterns in the adult listener. Once these 'sensors' are
tripped, they produce an involuntary, automatic caregiving response in the
adult listener that requires little or no cognitive processing. Support for this
theory is often seen in observations that crying is contagious among groups of
newborn infants, and that parental interventions in reaction to crying behavior
almost universally involve close physical contact (Murray 1979,1985).
A second explanation of adult reactions to infant crying, derived from
learning theory, posits that the cry of an infant becomes an aversive stimulus
which will elicit caregiving responses from adults as a means of reducing the
negative reinforcer (Murray 1985). It is thought that the cry is similar in
function to any other negative reinforcer, and that the adult's reaction is
understood solely in terms of its capacity to stop or otherwise remove the
aversive stimulus. One strength of this model is that it does not require the
highly specific relationship between the stimulus and its receptor mechanism
demanded by the innate releaser model. Rather, it seems to indicate that the cry
is an aversive stimulus which could result in a variety of behaviors. Of course,
this flexibility in the model can also be seen as a weakness, since the simplest
way for the parent to reduce the effects of the aversive crying would be to avoid
the infant altogether. So this model, although it might possibly help to account
for how caregiving behavior is maintained in individuals, cannot clearly
account for why such behaviors develop in the first place.
Finally, the third approach posits that the cry acts to elicit sympathy and
altruism from the caregiver (Murray 1979,1985). This approach is based on the
concept, "sympathetic distress", an involuntary and forceful experiencing of
another's emotional distress through cognitive and affective channels that is
highly correlated with helping behavior in adults (Hoffman 1975, 1984).
These theories are functional theories in the sense that they offer some
speculation concerning the possible advantages to infant and mother of infant
crying. But they are not strictly speaking evolutionary - even the one that is
ostensibly based on Bowlby's work - because they give no account of how
infant cries have come to take their particular form. Both functional and
evolutionary theories of behavior involve speculations concerning selection
pressures on behavior, but a fully evolutionary theory takes the additional step
of specifying the historical context in which such selection pressures are likely
to have operated and the archaic behaviors that these pressures have modified
to produce the current behavior (Symons 1992).
How, then, is a fully evolutionary theory of behavior possible, given that no
humans were around to make observations of the differential survival and
reproduction of the historical populations that giverise to modern populations?
The answer is that, because natural selection is a great tinkerer, the evolutionary
history of a trait often leaves traces in its contemporary form. A classic source
for this idea is Konrad Lorenz's (195111972)work on the geese and ducks in
which he traced the evolution of their displays in part from their degree of
resemblance to the non-communicatory behaviors from which they evolved.
Recent years have seen a great revival of combined comparative and historical
analyses leading to inferences not only of why a particular behavior or structure
has evolved, but from what and under what specific conditions (Coss &
Goldthwaite 1995; Foster 1995).
The human science that has attempted to make use of these ideas is
Evolutionary Psychology.Evolutionary psychologists interpret human behavior
in terms of the operation of information-processing mechanisms that were
developed during the 2 million years of the pleistocene, during which human
beings were hunter/gatherers (Tooby& Cosmides 1992; Bowlby1969h982). The
environmental circumstances that presided over human evolution are known
in the literature of evolutionary psychology as the Environment of Evolutionary
Adaptedness, abbreviated EEA. Although direct knowledge of human social
organization during the EEA is obviously scanty, it can be inferred from the
study of contemporary hunting/gathering cultures and from the study of the
social organizations of mammals, particularly primates, living in ecological
circumstances similar to those thought to exist for humans during the Pleisto-
cene. An evolutionary psychological approach to babies' cries suggests that
before there were cries as we now know them, babies' inhalations and exhala-
tions must have contained crucial information that adults were selected for
monitoring (Blumberg & Alberts 1997). It further suggests that babies should
have been selected to use those cue variables in such a way as to alter the
behavior of monitoring adults in ways advantageous to the babies and not
necessarily advantageous to the adults.
When one regardsbaby cries from an evolutionary psychologicalperspective,
one islead to wonder what characteristics ofbabies' sounds adults might havebeen
monitoring in the pleistocene that would have led to the evolution of babies cries
as methods for managing adult behavior. In pursuing this question, we are
applying to babies' cries a more general theory of animal communication devel-
oped by Donald Owings and collaborators known asthe management/ assessment
theory (Owings, Swaisgood & Rowe 1991; Owings & Hennesy 1984; Owings &
Morton 1997). For human beings, with their complex speech anatomy and the
compromises it has imposed on the respiratory apparatus, respiration is an
important issue and the pace and pattern of that respiration might be a particu-
larly important variable for caregivers to assess. Slowed, irregular or rasping
respiration can be indicative of obstruction of the breathing passages; rapid
respiration can be an indication of feveror other forms of physiological distress.
Thus the basic premise of our research program has been that the existence
of such a respiration-monitoring mechanism in adults was the fundamental
precondition for evolution of babies' cries as we now know them, that babies
have evolved to manipulate this mechanism in adults, and that the form of cries
bears traces of this evolutionary history. Listening to the cries of babies, both
our own and those of others, we thought we detected a melodramatic quality to
the cries, as if the babies were either simulating or threatening respiratory
distress. We have in an earlier paper developed the evolutionary logic behind
this hypothesis (Thompson, Olson & Dessureau 1997) and some specific
predictions derived from the theory concerning the respiratory patterns
projected by babies cries (Dessureau, Olson & Thompson 1998; Thompson,
Wheeler, Barth & Siegel 1996).
The idea that young animals are capable of extracting benefits from their
parents by manipulating them with threats or deceptions has its origin in
Robert Trivers early text, Social Evolution. In the course of a discussion of
conflicts of interest between offspring and their parents, Trivers proposes two
sorts of manipulation: deception and extortion. Deception, he argues, can arise
when an infant overstates its needs in its communications with its parent:
Both parent and offspring benefit from ... [a] ... system of communication, but
once such a system has evolved, the offspring can begin to employ it out of
context. The offspring can cry not only when famished, but also when it merely
wants more food than the parent is selected to give. Likewise, it can withhold its
smile until it has gotten its way. Selection will, of course, favor parental ability to
discriminate the two uses of the signals, but still subtler mimicry and deception
are always possible.
Extortion, he argues, arises when an infant acts in ways that, if continued, will
result in harm to itself.Trivers interprets temper tantrums as extortion attempts:
Temper tantrums are an interesting behavior by youngsters since in many
circumstances infants have not had an opportunity to learn such behavior
through studying others, and since the behavior seems to threaten the parent by
suggesting that the offspring may actually harm itself. For example, among
pelicans, chicks sometimes indulge in convulsions. [Citations to Schaller 1964and
to van Lawick-Goodall1968] [Trivers 1985, pp. 155-6.J
Following Trivers's logic, we are offered two possible ways in which crying may
have evolved to capitalize on parental sensitivity to signs of respiratory distress.
money from a parent (the kidnappEE) might send a ransom note that says, "Give
me the ransom ifyou want your baby back alive."Some asymmetry in the relative
value of the two incentives to the two participants is necessary to make such a
thr~at credible and effective. The kidnappEE must prefer having the baby to
havmg the ransom, and the kidnappER must prefer having the ransom to having
the baby. Thus, if we let Band b represent the intrinsic value of the baby to the
kidnappEE and kidnappER respectivelyand Rbe the value of the ransom, then for
a situation to meet the logical specifications of a kidnapping, B> R>b.
This sort of situation can often be usefully expressed as a "game table" by
representing the behavior options of each "player" and assigning a point value
to the outcomes. Table 1 represents the kidnapping situation as a two- player
game in which the kidnappER has the option of returning the baby or killing it
and the kidnappEE has the option of paying or refusing to pay.
In the analysis that follows, the two items of value, the baby and the money
are conceived of as in the hands of the kidnappER and the kidnappEE respec-
tively, so that, when an item changes hands, both kidnappER and kidnappEE
experience consequences, but when an item stayswhere it is, neither kidnappER
nor kidnappEE experience consequences. Also, partial payments of the ransom
are foreclosed: either the kidnappEE pays the ransom or not and either the
kidnappER returns the baby or keeps it irrevocably (or kills it). Finally, for the
purposes of this argument killing the baby or keeping it irrevocably are treated
as the same event - not returning the baby.
In Table 1, the upper left cell represents one of the two possible fulfillments
of the" contract" proposed by the kidnappER: the kidnappEE pays the ransom
(- R) and receives the baby (+B) and the kidnappER receives the ransom (+R)
In one, the extortion route, the infant in effect, threatens harm to itself if it
doesn't receive a "ransom" of increased parental care. In the other, the decep-
tion route, the infant, in effect, fakes a respiratory emergency to deceive the
parent into providing increased care.
Before we proceeded further with empirical testing of the implications of
our management theory of infant cries, we wanted to explore which of these
evolutionary routes was the most plausible. In other words, in the history of the
evolution of crying, would natural selection have been more likely to have
favored a situation in which the parent accurately responded to signs of
respiratory distress and the infant exploited these accurate perceptions by
threatening to do respiratory harm to itself; or would natural selection have
been more likely to favor a situation in which the parent responded to signs of
respiratory distress and infant exploited that susceptibility by simulating
respiratory distress without actually endangering its respiratory functioning.
The purpose of this essay is to consider the plausibility of each of these
ideas, extortion and deception, in turn.
The broad structure of extortion requires a threat of the form, if the extortionEE
doesn't X, the extortionER willY,where X is a state of affairs that the extortionER
wants but the extortionEE doesn't want and Y is a state of affairs the extortionEE
greatly fears but is of relatively little consequence to the extortionER. In the
crying baby case, the baby is in effect acting as its own kidnapper, extorting
care from its parents by threatening harm to itself. Understanding the
implications of such a model requires two steps: (1) understanding in some
detail the logical properties of any kidnapping situation; (2) considering how
the kidnapping situation is altered when the kidnapped baby is itself the
kidnappER and when the argument is conducted in an evolutionary context.
T~bl~ 1. Payoffs for kid?apper and kidnappee when the kidnapper either returns the baby or
kills It and when the kidnapper either pays or refuses to pays.
Pays
kn'ER gets R - b





Human kidnappings masquerade as ordinary business transactions, but their
logical properties are actually very strange. A kidnappER attempting to extort
kn'ERgets 0
kn'EE gets 0
and returns the baby (-b). The upper right cell represents the "Let's-just-forget-
the-whole-thing" outcome: the kidnappEE doesn't pay the money, but the
kidnapper returns the baby anyway (-b to the kidnappER, +B to the
kidnappEE). The lower left cell is the worst outcome for the kidnappEE, who
pays the money (- R) but doesn't get the baby; the kidnappER gets the ransom
and keeps the baby. The lower right cell is the other cell that fulfills the original
"contract" proposed by the kidnappER: the ransom is not paid and the baby
does not change hands. (Since the kidnappER already has the baby, keeping it
(or killing it) results in no change in score.)
What makes a kidnapping "contract" so odd is that despite appearances,
which behavior is best for the kidnappER is not contingent on the behavior of
the kidnappEE. What the kidnappER should do - whether or not the kid-
nappEE puts up the ransom - is already determined at the outset of the game
by the intrinsic value of the baby to the kidnappER. If that intrinsic value is
negative (b < 0), then the kidnappER should always return the baby, no matter
what the kidnappEE does, since when the ransom is paid, R- b > R and if it is
not paid, -b > o. But if the intrinsic value is positive, then the kidnappER
should never return the baby, no matter what the kidnap pEE does, since when
the ransom is paid, R- b < R and when it is not paid, b < o. That the intrinsic
value of the baby to the kidnappER is negative seems the more plausible
assumption, since keeping babies alive is hard work and exposes a kidnapper to
capture, and killing babies exposes the kidnapper to severe penalties.
Thus, for a kidnapping to work, the kidnapper must convince the kid-
nappEE that he is NOT a completely rational self-interested actor because a
fully rational kidnappER would not be influenced by the payment of the
ransom. So, the extortion will succeed only if the kidnappEE is rational and
believes that the kidnappER is irrational enough give up a baby which has a
positive intrinsic value when the ransom is paid or fail to return a baby that has
a negative intrinsic value if the ransom is not paid. In effect, the kidnappER
must convince the kidnappEE that the upper left cell- ransom is paid, baby is
returned - and the lower right cell- ransom is not paid, baby is killed - are
the ONLY cells in the table. Only when the rational kidnap pEE is forced to
compare ONLYthose cells, is paying the ransom a rational act.
Not returning the baby when the ransom is not paid is rational for the
kidnappER only if the game is iterated, that is, if the same playerswill repeatedly
play the same game. If the kidnappER has "a reputation to maintain" for
fulfilling his contracts because he intends to kidnap again, then assigning a
value for loss of face in the case that the ransom is not paid and the baby
returned will assure the rationality of not returning the baby. But, of course, it
would be totally irrational for the kidnappEE to participate in such an iterated
game if there were any way to avoid it. So, the only way that two participants
could rationally play the kidnapping game would be for the kidnappER to
believe that he was participating in an iterated game and the kidnappEE to
believe he was participating in a one- round game. This could be true only if the
kidnappER plans to victimize other kidnappEE's in the future and if the
outcome of the kidnapping is widely publicized.!
Applying the kidnapping model to the evolution, of babies' cries requires that
the baby be its own kidnapper and that the payoffs be reduced to a common
currency, fitness. These requirements in turn require important adjustments be
made in the model. The first adjustment is that the harm the kidnapper is
threatening is harm to him/herself. This adjustment immediately eliminates
iterated games from consideration, since the baby cannot both kill itself and yet
continue to play the game another round.2
The second adjustment required by treating babies' cries as kidnappers'
threats, is that the kidnapper, the baby, must be seen as related to the target of
the kidnapping, the parents, by r, the coefficient of relatedness. Thus, the
1. This feature of the kidnapping situation may suggest that an absence of publicity is a
crucial feature of defense against kidnappings. The logic of the situation would seem to
suggest that if the kidnapper were to suppose that (1) no ransom would be paid and (2) no
publicity would follow from the killing of the baby, then a rational professional kidnapper
should be less likely to kill the baby even in an iterated game.
2. Or at least it sets up a regress that leads to the same conclusion. Imagine that the baby
threatens sub-lethal respiratory harm to itself, h, and then carries through to "enforce" its
threat when its parents don't respond. When the second round of the game comes around,
the infant's value to the parents has been diminished by h and the parents should be that
much less likely to come to its rescue. Thus a sub-lethal threat to the self is not any more
rational in an iterated evolutionary game than a lethal one.
model must be adjusted so that the kidnappER and the kidnappEE each share by
r in the consequences that the other gets.Let'sset the cost of picking up the baby to
the parent at Pp' its value to the baby at Pb and the cost of the harm that the





Baby gets +Pb + [-P pJ12
Parent gets Pb12- Pp
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In other words, if a forced choice is made between picking up the baby or seeing
it harmed, then the parent will be selected for picking up, just so long as the
parent doesn't pay more in direct costs of picking up than it gains from the sum
of the indirect gains of picking up and indirect savings from harm-avoidance.
This analysis thus far suggests that if the infant-extortioner can be considered
irrational, then extortion by kidnapping might be considered a plausible model
for babies cries.
But is this feature of the analogy apt? Can irrationality ever be a feature in
an evolutionary games analysis? In evolutionary games theory, a strategy is
successful just in case the sum of its consequences across all partners is greater
than the sum of the alternative's consequences across all partners. The behavior
that is selected must represent the genetic interest of the individual BYDEFINI-
TIoN. Ifirrational action is understood as action against one's own best genetic
interest, then selection for irrationality is a contradiction in terms. Thus, if the
selection pressures operating on the parent are predicated on selection operat-
ing on the baby, then selection should favor the parent ignoring the ransom
request; if, on the other hand, the selection pressures operating on the parent
cannot be predicated on selection operating on the baby, no such inference is
justified. But this conclusion has devastating consequences for the whole
modeling enterprise, because ifwecannot presume that an individual is selected
by its own genetic interest, then evolutionary games analysis is itself irrational.
But, what if babies were selected for behaving AS IF they are not acting in
their own best interest; couldn't irrational-seeming behavior be selected for?
Perhaps. But if such behavior is successful it will be because it involves decep-
tion. And since we were considering extortion as an alternative to deception,
the best we can say about extortion at this point is that it might work in
conjunction with deception.
Table 2. Payoffs for parents and baby when the baby is the 'Kidnapper.'
Playing against Parent who
Pb>-H
or when the Parent doesn't pick up and
o>-H
Thus, as long as the harm the baby threatens is actual, the baby will always stop
crying whether or not the parent picks up. Once again, the baby's rational
interest is independent of the payment of the ransom and a rational parent who
presumes the baby to be rational should not pay the ransom, i.e., should ignore
the crying.
If the analogy with the human kidnapping is apt, an extortionEE that
presumes the extorting baby to be only partially rational, might be forced to
compare only the upper left and the lower right cells of the table (pay/return
with refuse/kill). Such a rational extortionEE acting in the face of a partially
rational extorting baby, should pay the ransom when
The second hypothesis to be considered is that the form of human babies' cries
has its origins in respiratory deception. If this hypothesis is correct, then crying
takes its present form because at some point in the evolution of the display and
parents' responses to it, parents were induced to behave as if babies were in
respiratory distress when in fact they were not. As in all deception models, the
crucial task for the modeler is to explain why the deceived individuals have not
evolved defenses against the deception. One possible reason, of course, is that
even though a baby's cry is deceptive with respect to respiratory hazard, it may
be related to the presence of other hazards. Another possible reason is that in
checking the baby for respiratory hazards, the adult may provide other benefits
to the baby unrelated to any hazard, such as social stimulation, food, or
diapering. These benefits may then enhance the fitness of the adult indirectly.
Any model that would consider the evolution of parental responsiveness to
deceptive babies cries' has to consider all the consequences of picking up the
baby in response to cries in comparison to all the consequences of picking up
the baby randomly with respect to the cries. As a baseline, imagine that parents
pick up their baby on some random schedule and the baby is subject to hazards
on an equally random and unrelated schedule. Imagine that some proportion
of the time, h, the baby is subject to a hazard, and that the rest of the time, 1-h,
the baby is hazard free.
Any parent that picks up a baby from time to time will receive payoffs that
come from three sources. The first source might be called the cost (c) of picking
up. It represents the negative consequences of taking time from other concerns
to come to the aid of the baby. The second source is the indirect benefits (b) on
the parent's fitness that accrue via the baby because picking up the baby is good
for the baby, whether or not there is a hazard. In accordance with inclusive
fitness theory, this benefit is weighted by the degree of relationship (r) between
the baby and the parent and is, therefore, rb. The third source is the negative
consequences to fitness that the parents experience when they fail to pick up
during the occurrence of a hazard. Like the benefit, this source is also weighted
by degree of relatedness, giving a cost (a negative) of rH to the parent.
Even in the absence of any warning about hazards, the parents randomly
picking up the baby will avert a hazard (h) of the time and receive the payoff
rb-c, the same payoff they receive on those (I-h) occasions when there is no
hazard. But on (h) of the occasions that the parents do not pick up, a hazard
will be present and the parents will receive a payoff of (-rH). Finally, on those
(I-h) occasions when the parent fails to pick up and no hazard is present, the
parent receives no payoff at all. These values are provided in Table 3.
Table 3. Payoffs for parents whose picking up is random with respect to hazards.









A parent picking up it's infant on such a random schedule will receive a total
payoff which consists of the sum of the four cells in Table 3, or
Frand = (rb-c) (h)+(rb-c) (I-h) + (-rH) (h)+(o) (I-h)
= rb-c-hrH
= rb-(c+hrH)
The result tells us that the total payoff from random helping will be sum of the
weighted positive payoffs receivedfrom picking up the infant less the sum of the
costsof picking up and the weightedlossesincurred when a hazard wasnot everted.
Now, stipulated in the deception argument is the premise that crying is
deceptive with respect to respiratory hazards; but there is no reason to suppose
that it is necessarily deceptive with respect to all hazards: Le., while the argu-
ment presupposes that in the course of human evolution, parents were induced
to pick up their babies because mechanisms attentive to respiratory hazard were
activated inappropriately, nothing in that presupposition prevents the cry from
having some information about some NON -respiratory hazard. If the cry DOES
contain such information, then the probability of at least one of two sorts of
appropriate responses will increase: the probability of the parent picking up the
baby when there is a hazard will increase by some amount (call it x) and the
probability of the parent NOT picking up the baby when there is NO hazard
will increase by a different amount (call it y). How informative would crying
have to be before natural selection would prefer responding to the cries over
random responding?
To determine the answer to this question we need first determine the
fitness payoffs that arise from responding to the baby's cries as if they were
signs of the existence of a hazard. These are given in Table 4.
When they
Outcome for pick up
Parents who pick --::----+----------+--------
up contingently When they
don't pick up
false alarms places the parents at no selective disadvantage, just so long as
responding to the baby's cry results in hazard avoidance. Why is this result so
counter-intuitive? Intuition may confuse the question of whether the parent
should cue on the baby's cry with the question of whether the hazard is worth
responding to at all. The above inequality, yrH > 0, tells us the circumstances in
which natural selection would prefer a contingent parental response to a
random one, but leaves standing the question of when natural selection would
prefer a contingent response to no parental response at all.
Those conditions would be met when all the advantages of responding to
the babies cries are greater than all the costs which happens when rb-yr[ -H] >
c, which is equivalent to r [b+ yH] > c.
These inequalities suggest two features of parental responses to babies cries
as deceptions. First, since "x", the increment in positive appropriate respond-
ing, does not appear in the inequality, the calculation suggests that as long as
the rule the parent uses to determine its response to crying is to some degree
successful in warding off hazardous events and/or provides some other benefit
to the baby, its failure to prevent the parent from acting unnecessarily to
prevent a hazard is irrelevant.
Second, since rb can by itself be greater than c, rendering the contribution
of hazard-avoidance irrelevant, even the capacity to avoid hazards by respond-
ing to babies cries may be irrelevant if the weighted direct benefits of respond-
ing to the cries overwhelm the direct costs. Thus, the analysis suggests that
crying might evolve from a condition of being a warning of respiratory distress
all the way to a condition of having no information value at all, if it induced
behaviors in adults that were sufficiently beneficial to the infants relative to the
costs to the adults.
Table 4. Payoffs for parents who respond to infants' hazard-related crying.
When a hazard is
The effects on the parents' total fitness from cry contingent interactions
with the baby will be the sum of the four cells in Table 4, hence
Fcont = [h+x] [rb-c]+[l-h-x] [rb-c]+ [h-y][-rH]+ [l-h+y] [0]
=rb-c-hrH+yrH
It will profit the parents to respond to the baby's cries when cry-contingent
responding is fitter than cry-random responding or when
yrH>o.
Thus, cuing on the crying infant should fail to evolve only if listening to the
baby's cry provides the parent with no information (y=o) or if there is no
hazard [H = 0], or there is no relationship between the "offspring" and the
parent. But if, on the other hand, the cry provides ANYinformation about ANY
degree of hazard to another individual that is related to ANY degree, then
natural selection will assure the responsiveness of the parent.
The most startling aspect of this result is that it suggests that responding to
The conclusion of this analysis is that the melodrama in babies cries is more
likely to have evolved as deception than as extortion. Deception seems a more
plausible explanation than extortion because the latter requires the contradicto-
ry assumption that natural selection is capable of selecting against the genetic
interests of an organism. Bycomparison, the assumptions required to rationalize
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a deception explanation - that the parent share in the benefits given to its
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